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ABSTRACT 
POLITICAL CONNECTEDNESS, FIRM PERFORMANCE AND CORPORATE RISK 
TAKING: ARE EMERGING MARKETS DIFFERENT? 
AUGUSTINE TARKOM 
Existing literature exploring the effect of politically connected firms on their performance 
and risk-taking seems to offer decisive results for the emerging and the developed 
market. However, from professionals and anecdotal evidence, both markets do not exhibit 
similar characteristics. Considering these characteristics, instability of the government, 
lack thereof of adequate governance structure, I revisit the topic.  This study comprises 
27 advanced and 20 emerging economies for the years 1992 through 2016. I find that 
sound political environment drives risk-taking in advanced markets, while political 
connections drive corporate risk-taking in emerging markets. I also find that political 
institutions and political connections drive firm performance in advanced and emerging 
economies respectively. The results are robust controlling for country and year effect as 
well as through the propensity score matching technique, the 2007/2009 financial crisis 
and instrumental variable estimation technique.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Political Connectedness, Risk-taking, Firm Performance, Emerging Markets 
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CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
1.0 Introduction 
Assessing political connectedness has been a topic of academic inquiry for 
decades, often focused on firm value, corporate governance and corporate risk-taking in a 
country (Boubakri, Mansi, & Saffar, 2013; Brockman, Rui, & Zou, 2013; Faccio & Hsu, 
2017; Niessen & Ruenzi, 2010). While there have been gradual improvements in the 
conceptualizations and the analytical techniques of political connectedness, many 
researchers and practitioners continue to focus on the limited breadth of its contribution, 
particularly with regards to the advanced world. Emerging markets as a whole have not 
attracted such comprehensive attention (Boubakri et al., 2013; Brockman et al., 2013; 
Faccio, 2010).  
Emerging markets have gained economic, management and political interest, but 
related research on them remains scanty. Sudhir et al., (2015) indicated that perhaps this 
could be attributed to the differences in the types of available and unavailable secondary 
data and the cost of these data sets. Understanding of these markets, which now account 
for 65% of the world's population and 40% of global economic output, is necessary to 
strengthen, perhaps even maintain, the importance of our academic enterprise. Reviewing 
the existing literature on the subject reveal gaps on emerging markets, as shown in Table 
1. Thus, there is a need for country and industry-specific study that exploits the unique 
characteristics of a particular emerging market rather than the routine cross-country 
studies in the extant literature.  
Kose and Prasad (2010) note that the emerging market's contribution to the 
world's gross domestic product (GDP) is enormous. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 
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(BBVA), they expect the contributions by emerging markets to grow more than those of 
by the advanced countries in the next five years (BBVA, 2014). Besides, multinational 
corporations around the world and across different sectors are seeking to invest heavily in 
these markets. Hence, conscious effort and attention should be given to these emerging 
markets to establish how prone or risk-free they are to the international investment scene.  
A better grasp of the nature and impact of political constrictions on firms' 
strategic decisions is of prime importance to multinational corporations in their quest to 
invest internationally. The present research seeks to advance this discussion by 
addressing the limited breadth of research particularly to the advanced world and 
extending the literature on the existing conceptual and the analytic techniques of political 
connectedness while making a case for the dichotomy that exists between the advanced 
world and the emerging markets. The primary objective of this research is to document 
how political connections can affect firm performance and corporate risk-taking.  
Findings suggest the oversimplification of extant papers is insufficient. The 
results are economically and statistically significant as well as robust. In effect, the 
findings suggest that countries with stable political institutions, firms are more likely to 
undertake risky ventures, whereas countries where firms have strong political 
connections, they are more likely to take risky ventures. Thus, strong political institutions 
or sound political environment lead to higher risk-taking in advanced markets than in 
emerging markets. On the other hand, due to the presence of high political connections in 
the emerging markets, my findings suggest that corporate risk-taking is high in emerging 
markets than in advanced markets. 
Also, the findings show that in advanced markets, firm performance reduces as 
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the soundness of the political environment increase. I find that political constraints do not 
matter when it comes to firm performance in emerging markets. On the other hand, I find 
that political connections matter in emerging markets, and as political connections 
increases, firms do not perform well. I also find that political connections do not matter in 
the level of firm performance of firms in advanced markets.  The results suggest that 
governments in both advanced and emerging markets should take necessary steps to 
control corruption to set fertile investment grounds and thus decrease political 
connections and extractions.  
The main objective of this study is to assess the impact of political connections on 
firm performance and corporate risk-taking by disaggregating emerging economies from 
advanced economies. Not only do I also add on to the literature by looking at how the 
presence of good governance can affect the results, but also how the interaction of 
political connections with political institutions can affect the results. This approach is 
different from the extant literature in that this tries to separate emerging economies from 
advanced economies by studying the same effect.   
The few studies (Boubakri et al., 2013; Brockman et al., 2013; Faccio, 2006) had 
combined emerging and advanced economies in their research. Aside from the 47 
countries studied, I also have a larger sample pool and broader year range. Unlike 
(Boubakri et al., 2013; Faccio, 2006) who had only 211,794 and 20,202 observation 
respectively, I have 562, 867 set of observation which expands from 1996 through 2016.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Literature Review 
Table 1 summarizes selected publications on political connections. The Table 
shows there is a dearth of literature in country-specific studies. The table show that none 
of the studies explicitly consider differences among emerging market in terms of political 
connections. In this study I do. Some studies (e.g. Boubakri et al., 2013) control for year 
and country effects, but a large variance remains unaccounted for. By segregating 
countries into advanced and emerging, I revisit the topic of political connectedness and 
corporate risk-taking behavior. Table 1 shows the existing gap in the literature. The 
literature on political connectedness is limited to country-specific studies and the limited 
attention that has been giving to emerging markets. I infer from Table 1 that the role of 
political connections to firm performance and corporate risk-taking in emerging markets 
is scanty.  
Some studies (Boubakri et al., 2013; Faccio, 2006) that looked at multiple 
countries tend to combine advanced and emerging markets in their inquiries. These 
markets do not exhibit the same characteristics regarding development and risk (see 
Figure 1). Hence, by their estimates, a general conclusion is formed, by forcing both 
economies into the same regression model, ignores variances and unique characteristics 
in these economies. 
In Figure 1, I present a graph of the standard errors of the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) for selected countries for both the advanced and the emerging markets. 
The WGI project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for over 200 
countries and territories over the period 1996–2016, for six dimensions of governance; 
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Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.  
Table 1: Summary of Literature by Top Journals 
Name (Year) Title Journal Country/Location 
Michael J. Cooper, 
Huseyin Gulen, And 
Alexei V. 
Ovtchinnikov (2010) 
Corporate Political 
Contributions and Stock 
Returns 
The Journal of 
Finance 
US 
Mara Faccio And 
Hung-Chia Hsu 
(2017) 
Politically Connected 
Private Equity and 
Employment 
The Journal of 
Finance 
US 
Vikramaditya Khanna, 
E. Han Kim, And Yao 
Lu (2015) 
CEO Connectedness 
and Corporate Fraud 
The Journal of 
Finance 
 
Joseph P.H. Fan, T.J. 
Wong, Tianyu Zhang 
(2007) 
Politically connected 
CEOs, corporate 
governance, and Post-
IPO performance of 
China’s newly partially 
privatized firms. 
Journal of Financial 
Economics 
China 
Pat Akey (2015) Valuing Changes in 
Political Networks: 
Evidence from 
Campaign Contributions 
to Close Congressional 
The Review of 
Financial Studies 
US 
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Elections 
Raymond Fisman 
(2001) 
Estimating the Value of 
Political Connections 
The American 
Economic Review 
Indonesia 
Mara Faccio (2006) Politically Connected 
Firms 
The American 
Economic Review 
Mixed Countries 
Alexandra Niessen 
and Stefan Ruenzi 
(2007) 
Political Connectedness 
and Firm Performance - 
Evidence from Germany 
German Economic 
Review 
Germany 
Simon Y.K. Fung, 
Ferdinand A. Gul, 
Suresh Radhakrishnan 
(2015) 
Corporate political 
connections and the 
2008 Malaysian election 
Accounting, 
Organizations, and 
Society 
Malaysia 
Chansog (Francis) 
Kim, Liandong Zhang 
(2015) 
Corporate Political 
Connections and Tax 
Aggressiveness 
Contemporary 
Accounting 
Research 
US 
Maria M. Correia 
(2014) 
Political connections 
and SEC enforcement 
 
Journal of 
Accounting and 
Economics 
 
Effiezal Aswadi 
Abdul 
Wahab, Mazlina Mat 
Zain, Kieran 
James, Hasnah 
Haron, (2009)  
Institutional investors, 
political connection and 
audit quality in 
Malaysia 
Accounting 
Research Journal 
Malaysia 
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Narjess Boubakri, 
Sattar A Mansi and 
Walid Saffar (2013) 
Political institutions, 
connectedness, and 
corporate risk-taking 
Journal of 
International 
Business Studies 
Mixed countries 
Paul Brockman, 
Oliver M Rui and 
Huan Zou (2013) 
Institutions and the 
performance of 
politically 
connected M&As 
Journal of 
International 
Business Studies 
Mixed countries 
Notes: In Table 1, I summarize some key literature in some selected top journals in 
Economics and Finance that shows that the extant literature on emerging markets is 
limited. I see that most of the literature are country-specific with most focusing on the 
advanced countries. There are just a few extant works that sort to have pool studies on 
several countries. However, studies showing the separation of the emerging markets from 
advanced markets on similar studies are limited or not found at all. 
 
Figure 1: Standard Errors of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (1996-2016) for 
Selected Advanced and Emerging Markets 
 
Notes: Figure 1 shows a plot of the standard errors of the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI). The WGI covers over two hundred countries and territories, measuring 
six dimensions of governance starting in 1996: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule 
of Law, and Control of Corruption. The red line represents evidence in advanced markets 
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whereas, the green line represents evidence from emerging markets. This graph aids in a 
visual impression about the variations that exist in the two markets, therefore these markets 
should be studied independently. 
 
Several theories help to explain the existence and mechanisms of political 
connections. Two such theories are based on theories of reputation and rent-seeking. 
Reputation theory stresses the relevance of associations, and holds that politically 
connected executives serve as a substitute medium for creating a firm's reputation when 
quality disclosure is absent (Liu, Sun, & Liu, 2003; Yu & Pan, 2008). On the other hand, 
rent-seeking theory demonstrates political connections by suggesting that firms use them 
to partake in events that impact the government’s endorsement decisions and government 
officials  then exhibit preferences to firms whose boards pledge to offer personal favors 
(Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007). 
To assess whether it is rewarding for firms to be politically connected, I revisit the 
existing literature. Firms get themselves connected to politicians in order to obtain 
preferential treatment, get access to government contracts and relaxed regulatory 
environment (Domadenik, Prašnikar, & Svejnar, 2016). While political connections have 
been shown in previous research to increase firm value (Faccio, 2006; Fisman, 2001; 
Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999; Johnson & Mitton, 2003), recent studies show 
that such connections can be obstructive and unfavorable to firm value (Brockman et al., 
2013; Faccio, 2010; Fan et al., 2007). For instance, a connected CEO embarking on an 
activity that is of private gains can be to the detriment of the firm in general. Such a 
decision leads to poorer performance by the connected firms relative to unconnected 
counterparts. Boubakri, et al. (2012) presented similar findings and concluded that 
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politically connected firms are typically considered less risky than their non-connected 
counterparts. The route through which firm connections leads to economic benefit or loss 
is also blurred (Brockman et al., 2013). The goal of this paper is not to solve the mixed 
evidence problem, instead, to ascertain how different, if at all, the evidence is in 
emerging markets from advanced markets. 
2.1 The Need to Consider Emerging Markets 
Since the early 1990s, emerging markets have gradually become notable on the 
world economic stage, accounting for a significant fraction of world growth and 
intensifying in importance by virtually any economic criterion (Kose & Prasad, 2010). 
Emerging markets’ is driven by several strong secular trends: improving demographics 
provide a young and increasingly well-educated, growing workforce; while on the other 
side of the equation, a rising middle class, specifically in urban areas, will continue to 
propel strong consumption growth across many markets.  
Many multinational corporations (MNCs) draw back from emerging markets 
when they should have engaged with them more closely. Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha 
(2005) asserted that corporations could lower cost by establishing manufacturing and 
service facilities in these markets, because these markets have inexpensive skilled labor 
and trained executives. They are now at the core when it comes to global economic 
growth. In Figure 2, it is observe a rise in GDP in the different markets from 1960-2010 
(Kose & Prasad, 2010). According to the BBVA, 2014 report, the emerging markets 
broken into two groups based on their economic development, the EAGLEs (China, 
India, Indonesia, Russia, Brazil, Turkey and Mexico) and the NEST (Nigeria, Thailand, 
Colombia, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kazakhstan, Qatar, Malaysia, 
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Vietnam, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Poland, Egypt, Peru, South Africa, Chile and Argentina) 
countries are projected to contribute about 65% of global growth in the next ten years, led 
by China (30%) and India (11%), while the G7 
(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States) group 
will add 19%.  
Figure 2: Evolution of GDP of Different Groups: 1960-2010 (per capita, PPP weighted) 
 
Source: (Kose & Prasad, 2010) 
 
BBVA (2014) noted that the annual share of the world's GDP growth from the G7 
countries is expected to remain below 2%, while the share of the world's GDP growth 
from emerging markets will outpace the industrialized countries in the next 5 years 
(Figure 3). By 2050, the EAGLES will be about 50% larger than G7 economies BBVA 
(2014). These developments are likely to have wide-ranging implications for the structure 
of the global and political economy. MNCs around the world and across different sectors 
are in a quest for opportunities in these markets, and they can offer the new consumers. 
Nonetheless, it is prudent to learn that even though there exist differences in these 
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emerging markets, the differences are primarily not so different from one another but 
could be different from developed countries, when it comes to how political connections 
impact firm performance and corporate risk-taking, especially as they mature. 
In emerging markets where the formal institutional framework is not adequate, 
political connections play a critical role in facilitating economic exchange (Fan et al., 
2007; Tsang, 1998). According to Tsang (1998), corporate political connections have 
become a useful way to lobby favors with government authorities. These authorities still 
have the power to approve projects, allocate resources and interfere in the corporate 
operations.  
Figure 3: Share of World GDP adjusted PPP: 45 Emerging Markets vs. Industrialized 
Economies 
 
Source: BBVA Research and IMF WEO 
The study of the interaction between corporations and politics is still on the 
ascendancy and has gain momentum in academic research (see Table 1). In the course of 
such interactions, politicians may interfere in the firm’s employment decisions to keep 
12 
 
enormous employment avenues and pay higher wages in order to gain their political 
support. Politicians for their part use their political power to grant favors to firms in the 
form of government subsidies (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Connected firms, in turn, have 
to pay a high political price, mostly in the form of high employment levels. Connected 
firms are always willing to balance their hiring and firing decisions in support of 
politicians who seek to maintain political power. These actions are mostly observable 
when firms exhibit more job creation and less destructive activities towards 
electioneering years. Specifically, (Desai & Olofsgård, 2008) noted that most connected 
firms, especially state-owned enterprises, tend to employ more surplus labor towards 
election periods. It is not surprising to see connected financial institutions lowering 
lending rates in election periods. Thus, being politically connected can be a two-edged 
sword; it presents itself with both benefits and costs. 
2.2 Conceptual Framework 
Corporate political connections represent a unique type of corporate resource in 
emerging markets (Chen, Ding, & Kim, 2010; H. Li et al., 2008; Peng & Luo, 2000; 
Sheng, Zhou, & Li, 2011). Specifically, in markets where the formal institutional 
framework is not well established, political connections play a critical role in facilitating 
economic exchange (J. P. H. Fan, Huang, Morck, & Yeung, 2009; Tsang, 1998). 
I fellow Faccio (2006); Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2011); and Henisz (2010) 
and the following variables; political connections (CONN) - % of firms connected with a 
minister or MP, excluding cases of close relationships, divided by the total number of 
firms listed in a country, risk (RISK) - estimated as country-specific ROA in five-year 
overlapping periods beginning in 1992 and ending in 2016, return on assets (ROA) - 
13 
 
measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to 
total assets, and political institutions (POL) - measures the degree of political constraint 
of a country. These measures have also been used extensively in some related literature 
such as Ang, Ding, and Thong (2013); Boubakri et al. (2013); Domadenik et al. (2016); 
Jackowicz, Kozłowski, and Mielcarz (2014). 
To study the impact of political institutions on corporate risk-taking, Boubakri, 
Mansi, and Saffar (2013) used pooled multivariate regressions in their analysis. They 
found that sound political institutions positively drive corporate risk-taking, which was 
exacerbated in countries where government extraction is higher. Their finding revealed 
that connected firms engaged in risk-taking, which suggests that close ties to government 
leads to less conservative venture decisions. 
Well-connected firms present in either emerging or advanced markets may or may 
not see improved performance, even if they are earning political favors, because of the 
resources they may require in such a rent-seeking activity (Fisman, 2001). Irrespective of 
the fact that some research findings show a negative relationship between political 
connections and firm performance (Ling et al., 2016), several studies have shown that 
corporate political connections lead to improved firm performance in emerging markets, 
specifically in China (Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2009; Haiyang & Zhang, 2007; Li, 
Meng, Wang, & Zhou, 2008). 
The benefits of political ties are more significant in countries with relatively high 
intrusive governments and weak protection of property rights (Faccio, 2006). Wu et al. 
(2012) document that politically connected firms underperform their unconnected rivals. 
Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha, (2005) document that corporations could lower costs by 
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establishing manufacturing and service facilities in these markets. Again and Zhang   
(2007); Nee (1992); Peng and Luo (2000) document that corporate political connections 
improve firm performance in emerging markets.   
CHAPTER THREE: DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
3.0 Research Design and Data 
3.1 Model 
I estimate the following models to explore the effect of political connectedness 
and political constraints in emerging and developed countries. The two regression models 
represented in equations (1) and (2), utilize the full sample without segregating between 
emerging and advanced economies and subsequently disaggregate the emerging markets 
from advanced markets. Specifically, I estimate the following regression models: 
3.2 Pool OLS Models 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 = 
∝  + 𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑢𝑚𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽6𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽12𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖,𝑡  
+  𝜖𝑖,𝑡 … … … … … … … . … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (1) 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 = 
∝  + 𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑢𝑚𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽6𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐺𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽12𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽13𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖,𝑡
+  𝜀 … … … … … … … . … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (2) 
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where RISK is defined as, and measured as the country-adjusted volatility of firms' ROA 
over 5-years; POL is Henisz’ (2010) index of political constraints; CONN is a proxy for 
political connections captured by Faccio (2006) as the percentage of firms connected with 
a minister or Member of Parliament (MP); and GOVERN is the proxy for the governance 
indicators. Some variables serve as country control variables, including real GDP per 
capita growth (annual %) (GDPPG), Financial system deposits to GDP (%) (FSD), 
Remittance inflows to GDP (%) (RINF). Firm controls refer to the set of firm-level 
control variables (SIZE - log of total assets in millions of US$, LEV - the ratio of total 
debt to total assets, GROWTH - average assets growth over five years, where assets are 
converted into US$., CPINT - calculated by dividing the total assets of a company by its 
sales, and ROA - measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, 
and amortization to total assets.) Additional controls include country (COUNTRY) and 
industry (FF) fixed effects, and ε is an error term. I utilize the 48 industry indicators 
based on Fama and French’s 48-digit industry classifications for the industry fixed effects 
(Fama & French, 1997). The 48-industry classification scheme is “defined with the goal 
of having a manageable number of distinct industries that cover all NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ stocks” (p. 156) 
My focus in this analysis is the coefficient, 𝛽1, which measures the sensitivity of 
corporate risk-taking to the quality of the political institutions prevalent in a country. A 
positive directionality suggests that sound political institutions drives higher corporate 
risk-taking. 𝛽2 is another coefficient of importance. According to Faccio (2006), it is the 
number of firms connected with a minister or MP, excluding cases of close relationships, 
divided by the total number of firms listed in a country. This ratio ranges from a 
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minimum of 0 percent (denoting no connections) to a maximum of 12 percent (high 
connections), found for the country Russia. A positive coefficient indicates that political 
connectedness drives higher corporate risk-taking.  
In addition to exploring if a divergence exists on the drivers of risk-taking in 
countries, I expand the testable inquiry to ascertain if the effect of sound political 
environment is dependent on the level of political connectedness in countries. 𝛽3 denotes 
the coefficient of the effect of the interaction between political connections and political 
institutions. I make use of a categorical-continuous interaction, where, the dummy 
variable, (DumCONN), denotes a dummy for CONN. Any value greater than the median 
(1.29) value, is captured as 1 for strong politically connected countries, otherwise 0 for 
weak politically connected countries. I interacted this dummy with a continuous variable, 
POL. Since the advanced markets have sound political institutions but less political 
connections, I expect a negative coefficient, but a positive coefficient for emerging 
markets since the political environment in these economies are unsound but with more 
political connections. 
3.4 Variable Measurements  
Firms’ financial data are obtained from COMPUSTAT Global, political 
institutions variable from Henisz (2010) political constraint index, political 
connectedness variable is based on Faccio (2006) data, and the macroeconomic variables 
are collected from the World Bank World Development Indicators as well as Financial 
Structure Database for the years 1992 through 2016. Also, included in the analysis are the 
six Worldwide Governance Indicators. These are voice and accountability (VA), control 
of corruption (CC), government effectiveness (GE), political stability and absence of 
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violence/terrorism (PSA), regulatory quality (RQ), and the rule of law (RL). 
Estimates on governance range from approximately -2.50 (weak) to 2.50 (strong) 
governance performance. Due to the high correlation among the six governance 
indicators, also evident in Panel B, I applied the principal component analysis 
methodology to transform these variables into a single variable, GOVERN, which 
captures the transformed WGI indicators. Principal components analysis (PCA) was 
introduced by Harold Hotelling (1933) as a way to determine factors with statistical 
learning techniques when factors are not exogenous. PCA works best when asset 
variables are correlated, and also when the distribution of variables varies across cases 
(Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006).  
3.5 Risk-Taking Variables 
I follow Faccio et al. (2011) to estimate corporate risk-taking (RISK) as country-
specific ROA in five-year overlapping periods beginning in 1996 and ending in 2016, 
(1992 - 1996, …, 2012 - 2016) where ROA is calculated as the ratio of earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets. To check for 
robustness, I considered two other risk-taking measures. RISK1 is country-adjusted 
volatility of earnings for each firm over the entire sampling period (1992 - 2016), 
requiring at least five observations in cross-sectional regressions. RISK2 is the country-
wide average of all RISK observations at the enterprise level.  
3.6 Control Variables 
I check for the characteristics of firms and countries that have been shown to 
affect business risk-taking such as (Faccio et al., 2011; Johnson & Mitton, 2003). These 
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controls include asset growth, firm size, profitability, and leverage. Growth (GROWTH), 
is a substitute for the impact of firm-specific growth opportunities on business risk. It is 
calculated as the average increase in the company's total assets in US dollars for five 
years. Firm’s size (SIZE), a proxy for economies of scale, is counted as the natural log of 
total assets in millions of dollars. Firm profitability [ROA], a performance representative, 
is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization that are 
staggered from total assets. Fixed Leverage [LEV], a proxy for financial health, is 
measured as the ratio of total long-term and short-term debt, staggered by assets.  
I also included data from the Financial Structure Database, which provides 
statistics on the size, activity, efficiency, and stability of banks, non-banks, equity 
markets, and bond markets across a broad spectrum of countries over time. It also 
contains various indicators of financial globalization, including statistics on international 
bond issues, international loans, offshore deposits and remittance flows (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 2010). The variables I include from this database are; 
financial system deposits to GDP (%) [FSD] and remittance inflows to GDP (%) (RINF). 
Finally, I also included GDP per capita growth (annual %) (GDPPG) from the World 
Development Indicators. 
3.6 Data 
The sample I used to answer the research questions consists of 562, 867 
observations, in 47 countries spanning 1996 – 2016. I considered the non-financial firms 
covered by COMPUSTAT Global and COMPUSTAT North America from the period 
1992 through 2016. I exclude financial corporations with SIC codes between 6000 - 6999 
and 4900 - 4999 because their profitability indices, leverage and growth rates, are 
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calculated differently from those of non-financial companies because they are regulated 
and then highly sensitive to the planning of a country's political institutions. The sample 
includes both active and non-active firms from 47 countries to mitigate concerns about 
breaches of survival by less risk-taking firms. 
The sample selection process is as follows: I started by listing countries that are 
present in Faccio (2006). These comprise 47 countries of which 20 are emerging markets, 
and 27 are advanced economies. I went ahead to include countries from Faccio (2006) 
that are present in Henisz’s (2010) political constraint index since this is another prime 
variable of interest and it is robust to capture the presence and effects of political 
institutions. I realized that Faccio (2006) had Zimbabwe as part of the countries she 
studied but excluded China. However, in the sample, I excluded Zimbabwe because 
Zimbabwe had many missing data for most of the variables which could have affected the 
number of observations significantly. 
I included China in the sample because it was present in the Henisz (2010) data 
set. Adding China is suitable because it one of the chief drivers in emerging economies 
and because Henisz (2010) political constraint index is very robust concerning the role 
political institutions play in corporate decision making. This substitution still in a total of 
47 countries in the study. 
I disaggregate the sample into advanced and emerging economies based on Banco 
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, (BBVA, 2014) classifications. In efforts to understand the 
significant transformation in the international investment scene and the search of giving 
transparency, flexibility, and dynamism to the identification of the most important 
economies in the emerging world, BBVA Research in 2010 created a grouping of 
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emerging economies called BBVA EAGLEs (Emerging and Growth-Leading 
Economies). Their classification groups a pool of 45 emerging economies into EAGLEs 
and NEST with the remaining categorized as other emerging markets. They defined the 
membership of the EAGLEs and NEST based on a reference variable used in their 
calculations as the incremental GDP, that is, the increase of real GDP in PPP-adjusted 
terms in the following ten years. 
For this research, selection of emerging economies is driven by Faccio (2006) 
data and BBVA research. From BBVA, the EAGLEs countries are: China, India, 
Indonesia, Russia, Brazil, Turkey and Mexico, and the NEST countries are Nigeria, 
Thailand, Colombia, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kazakhstan, Qatar, Malaysia, 
Vietnam, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Poland, Egypt, Peru, South Africa, Chile and Argentina. 
Based on BBVA classifications, countries present in Faccio (2006) were categorized as 
emerging markets. Due missing values present in the data, the data set is unbalanced data 
for the study. The definitions and sources of the data are provided in the Appendix. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.0 Univariate Analysis 
Panel A in Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables based on the full 
sample. The statistics included are the sample size, mean, standard deviation, minimum 
and maximum value, 25th and 75th percentile as well as the median. Among the key 
variables, the mean (standard deviation) of RISK, POL, CONN and ROA are 0.19 (0.15), 
0.71 (0.24), 2.08 (2.50) and -0.56 (61.19), respectively. The statistics for political 
institutions (POL) suggest that most of the countries contained in the sample have strong 
political constraints, that is, a sound political environment. The descriptive summary is 
closely consistent with what Boubakri, Mansi, and Saffar (2013) found in their study, that 
most of the countries had strong political constraints. The difference can be attributed to 
the large sample size of 562, 867 I used as against their 211, 794 sample size.  
The statistics for political connections (CONN) as captured by Faccio (2006) as a 
percentage of firms connected with a minister or MP suggests that most firms in the 
sample may not suffer from political connectedness. The exception here is Russia and 
Italy with a double-digit value in connectedness. With regards to the RISK variable, most 
of the countries in the sample are less risky, hence, safe and sound for investment 
purposes. This is an indication that firms located in such countries are more likely to take 
risky ventures. Firm performance (ROA) also suggests that most firms in the sample 
receive negative returns on their assets.   
The previous arguments based on the descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 – 
Panel A highlights the statistics that exist in the full sample. Next, I present the 
correlation matrix on the complete sample. All figures are significant at 1% level, except 
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those bolded. The correlation matrix presented in Panel B shows that POL, CPINT, 
GDPPG, and all the governance indicators are significant at 1% level and negatively 
correlated with RISK. On the other hand, CONN, ROA, FSD, RINF, lnGROWTH, and 
SIZE are significant and positively correlated with RISK. LEV is insignificant but 
positively correlated with RISK. All the observed correlation coefficients are weakly 
correlated with RISK.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Panel A: Pooled Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable       N      Mean       SD           Min 25%      Median 75%          Max 
RISK 562867 0.19 0.15 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.39 0.42 
POL 562599 0.71 0.24 0.00 0.74 0.77 0.85 0.89 
CONN 521552 2.08 2.50 0.00 0.08 1.29 2.79 12.00 
ROA 546790 -0.56 61.19 -32577.29 0.01 0.08 0.14 1106.00 
FSD 508193 85.75 51.75 0.07 54.94 65.11 98.71 479.67 
RINF 528865 0.67 1.34 0.00 0.04 0.18 0.52 13.32 
CPINT 549820 0.30 0.24 -1.65 0.09 0.25 0.44 3.68 
GDPPG 539152 2.53 3.04 -14.35 0.87 2.11 3.63 24.76 
SIZE 550115 6.42 3.35 -6.91 4.18 6.32 8.55 24.14 
LEV 549313 0.92 100.44 -0.19 0.03 0.19 0.36 60446.50 
lnGROWTH 534852 6.79 3.18 -8.52 4.55 6.63 8.85 23.37 
VA 562599 0.75 0.84 -1.75 0.44 1.07 1.33 1.80 
RQ 562599 0.99 0.76 -2.00 0.51 1.26 1.59 2.26 
PSA 562599 0.34 0.81 -2.37 -0.21 0.52 1.01 1.76 
CC 562599 1.00 0.92 -1.40 0.11 1.37 1.70 2.47 
GE 562489 1.16 0.72 -1.29 0.48 1.49 1.68 2.44 
RL 562572 1.06 0.80 -2.18 0.38 1.44 1.64 2.10 
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Panel B: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix 
  RISK POL CONN  ROA FSD RINF CPINT GDPPG SIZE LEV GROWTH VA RQ PSA CC GE RL 
RISK 1.00 
  
 
               
POL -0.05 1.00 
 
 
               
CONN 0.03 -0.42 1.00  
               
ROA 0.00 -0.01 0.01  1.00 
              
FSD 0.08 0.14 0.00  0.00 1.00 
             
RINF 0.06 -0.11 0.12  0.00 -0.24 1.00             
CPINT -0.03 -0.07 0.04  0.01 0.00 0.07 1.00 
          
GDPPG -0.11 -0.48 0.07  0.00 -0.35 0.27 0.06 1.00                
SIZE 0.06 -0.20 0.07  0.03 0.29 0.10 0.16 0.05 1.00 
         
LEV 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.32 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 1.00 
        
lnGROWTH 0.04 -0.19 0.07  0.01 0.28 0.07 0.15 0.04 0.90 -0.01 1.00 
       
VA -0.11 0.83 -0.46  0.00 0.24 -0.21 -0.08 -0.56 -0.23 0.00 -0.20 1.00 
      
RQ -0.09 0.49 -0.19  -0.01 0.30 -0.56 -0.10 -0.54 -0.31 0.00 -0.20 0.75 1.00      
PSA -0.05 0.36 -0.26  0.00 0.47 -0.58 -0.04 -0.47 -0.11 0.00 -0.20 0.60 0.81 1.00 
   
CC -0.10 0.50 -0.24  0.00 0.36 -0.53 -0.10 -0.52 -0.30 0.00 -0.20 0.77 0.95 0.82 1.00     
GE -0.08 0.49 -0.22  0.00 0.38 -0.57 -0.11 -0.52 -0.27 0.00 -0.20 0.71 0.96 0.83 0.96 1.00   
RL -0.08 0.63 -0.31  -0.01 0.35 -0.48 -0.11 -0.56 -0.30 0.00 -0.20 0.84 0.94 0.81 0.96 0.95 1.00 
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Panel C: Summary Statistics for Advanced Markets 
Variable         N      Mean      SD            Min 25%   Median 75%           Max 
RISK 397972 0.19 0.15 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.33 0.42 
POL 397972 0.79 0.14 0.00 0.75 0.85 0.85 0.89 
CONN 397972 1.69 2.31 0.00 0.08 1.29 1.31 10.30 
ROA 386384 -0.77 69.90 -32577.29 -0.02 0.07 0.13 1106.00 
FSD 343566 100.14 55.04 0.07 63.83 78.09 111.68 479.67 
RINF 364238 0.19 0.30 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.22 3.58 
CPINT 388476 0.28 0.24 -0.36 0.07 0.22 0.41 3.51 
GDPPG 374525 1.39 2.00 -9.00 0.76 1.59 2.60 24.77 
SIZE 388748 6.10 3.58 -6.91 3.56 5.79 8.65 19.38 
LEV 388081 0.98 67.15 -0.19 0.02 0.18 0.35 29106.57 
lnGROWTH 371413 6.54 3.39 -8.52 3.99 6.20 9.06 19.24 
GOVERN 397862 0.57 0.43 -1.33 0.42 0.59 0.84 1.77 
 
Panel D: Summary Statistics for Emerging Markets 
Variable     N      Mean        SD             Min 25% 
 
Median 
75%           Max 
RISK 164627 0.21 0.15 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.40 0.42 
POL 164627 0.51 0.31 0.00 0.27 0.72 0.77 0.85 
CONN 123580 3.31 2.69 0.00 2.25 2.79 5.17 12.00 
ROA 160140 -0.07 31.56 -11534.00 0.03 0.09 0.14 9.45 
FSD 164627 55.73 24.70 11.48 41.72 48.91 60.70 126.37 
RINF 164627 1.73 1.97 0.00 0.25 0.85 3.00 13.32 
CPINT 161077 0.34 0.22 -1.65 0.16 0.32 0.50 3.68 
GDPPG 164627 5.13 3.39 -14.35 3.17 5.53 7.24 16.23 
SIZE 161100 7.19 2.56 -6.91 5.61 6.99 8.41 24.14 
LEV 160965 0.78 153.48 -0.11 0.06 0.22 0.38 60446.50 
lnGROWTH 163171 7.38 2.56 -6.03 5.79 7.12 8.55 23.37 
GOVERN 164600 -1.37 0.56 -3.40 -1.74 -1.54 -1.14 0.24 
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Panel E: Independent Samples T-Test 
Variable Mean_Adv Mean_Emerg Mean_Diff. SE_Diff T-Stats P-value 
POL 0.79 0.51 0.28 0.00 349.24 0.00 
CONN 1.69 3.31 -1.62 0.01 -190.99 0.00 
GOVERN 0.57 -1.37 1.94 0.00 1272.59 0.00 
RISK 0.19 0.21 -0.03 0.00 -59.40 0.00 
Note: Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all the variables used in my empirical 
models. Panel A presents a pool descriptive of both advanced and emerging markets. Panel 
B exhibits the correlation matrix for my key variables. I observe a high correlation between 
the governance indicators, hence, in Panel C, D, and E where I disaggregate emerging 
markets from advanced markets, I used a new variable, GOVERN, as a proxy for the 
governance indicators which were transformed using principal component analysis. In 
Panel E, I conduct an independent sample t-test to show the difference in means between 
the two markets. The results show that there is a difference in the means of POL, CONN, 
GOVERN, and RISK between these two markets. 
 
Figure 4: Means Plot of POL CONN, RISK & GOVERN 
 
Notes: This figure depicts a graphical representation of the difference that exists between 
the advanced and emerging markets based on the means of POL, CONN, GOVERN, and 
RISK variables. I used a dummy to reflect these markets. I capture advanced markets as 
(0) and emerging markets as (1). The graph depicts that there are more political 
connections in emerging markets than there is in advanced markets. Also, the political 
environment in the advanced markets is more stable than in the emerging market 
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The correlation between RISK and POL as well as GDP per capita growth are not 
consistent with findings by (Boubakri et al., 2013). The correlation between RISK and 
POL tells us that firms that are located in countries with unsound political institutions are 
associated with less risk-taking. On the other hand, firms that are located in a more stable 
or sound political environment tends to take more risk. Again, the positive correlation 
between RISK and CONN is also expected. Also, aside from LEV, VA, RL that are 
significant and negatively correlated with ROA, the rest of the variables are significant 
and positively correlated with ROA. The variables that are insignificant to ROA are PSA 
and FSD.  
The correlation between ROA and CONN tells us that on average, firms that are 
more politically connected achieve higher returns on their assets. This, suggests that 
connected firms may use their opportunities to seek preferential treatment and get 
governments approval for significant projects, leading to an increase in their ROA. This 
evidence confirms studies by Haiyang and Zhang (2007); Nee (1992); Peng and Luo 
(2000); and Tsang (1998). Also, governance indicators are strongly correlated with one 
another. The smallest correlation coefficient is 0.60 and the highest is 0.96. 
Panel A shows the summary statistics for the key variables based on the full 
sample. I now disaggregate these markets to see how the statistics may vary. In Panel C 
and D, we present the summary statistics on advanced and emerging countries for the key 
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variables respectively. With regards to POL, the mean (0.79) for the advanced markets is 
higher than the mean (0.51) of the emerging markets, indicating that on average, political 
institutions in advanced markets are sounder than those in emerging markets.  
Political connection (CONN) in the advanced markets has a mean of 1.69 which 
is a little less than half of the mean of political connections in the emerging markets with 
a value of 3.31 — suggesting, that on average, political connectedness in the emerging 
markets is more than those in advanced markets. Interestingly, an emerging (Russia) and 
a developed (Italy) economy had double digits value in political connections, suggesting 
that political connections (though prevalent in the emerging markets) may also occur 
advanced countries. Concerning RISK, I also observed that on average, advanced 
countries exhibit less risk compared to emerging markets. 
The mean of the return on assets (ROA) for the two markets is -0.77 and -0.07 for 
advanced and emerging markets, respectively. On average, firms in emerging markets 
receive a higher return on assets do firms in advanced markets. The statistics for 
GOVERN, 0.57 and -1.37 for advanced and emerging markets, respectively, tells us that 
on average, there is strong governance in advance markets and weak governance in 
emerging markets.  
To assess whether advanced markets are different from emerging markets 
regarding how political connections may or may not affect firm performance and 
corporate risk-taking, I performed an independent sample t-test. The t-test assesses 
whether the means of two groups (Advanced and Emerging markets) are statistically 
different from each other. Panel E presents the results of the four key variables: POL, 
CONN, GOVERN, and RISK. I assumed that the variance in the sample is unequal. 
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Hence, the Welch's t-test is applied. 
Panel E shows a mean difference of 0.28, -1.62, 1.94 and -0.03 for the POL, 
CONN, GOVERN, and RISK respectively. All tests are significant at the 1% level. The 
corresponding t-test and p-value indicate that the difference in means in POL, CONN, 
GOVERN and RISK between advanced and emerging markets are significantly different 
from 0, allowing for differences in variances across groups. This result is supported 
graphically in Figure 4. This chart shows the disparities that exist between these two 
markets. Advanced markets are denoted by dummy of zero (0) and emerging markets by 
one (1). Interestingly, firms emerging markets have lower outcomes regarding world 
governance but are more politically connected. Suggesting that firms are more likely to 
be politically connected in countries with weak governance indicators.
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4.1 Multivariate Analysis 
This section reports findings of the impact of political institutions, and 
connectedness (in addition to firm characteristics) on corporate risk-taking in advanced 
and emerging markets, using the combined multivariate regression framework. Table 3 
provides the regression results of models 1 and 2 using robust standard errors corrected 
for the grouping at the firm level.   
4.2 Evidence for Risk Taking 
Results in column (1) of Panel A indicate that except for LEV, all the variables 
included in the model are significant at the 1% level in explaining the variations in risk-
taking, and ROA is also significant at the 10% level. The results show that corporate risk-
taking increases as political constraints increase. Thus, an increase of one standard 
deviation in political constraints (institutions) causes an increase of 14.8% 
(=0.0925*0.24/0.15) of a standard deviation in increased risk-taking in the full sample. 
The evidence is consistent with Boubakri et al. (2013) and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1991) who also found a positive relation between political institutions (POL) and 
corporate risk-taking (RISK). I also find a significant and negative relationship between 
political connections (CONN) and corporate risk-taking (RISK). In order words, a one 
standard deviation increase in political connections leads on average to about 67% (= -
0.0404*2.5/0.15) decrease in risk-taking in the full sample. This is inconsistent with the 
findings by (Caprio, Faccio, & McConnell, 2013). Again, these results indicate that all 
the financial variables that are statistically significant, have negative effects on risk-
taking. Likewise, gross domestic product per capita growth (GDPPG), except SIZE 
which has a positive effect.  
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Column (2) modifies column (1) to include the proxy for governance indicators 
(GOVERN). To the best of my knowledge, none of the previously related literature has 
considered governance in their analysis. Hence, including this variable serves as one of 
the contributions to the literature. The results are the same as those as in column (1). 
Therefore, if there is a one standard deviation point increase in POL, risk-taking increases 
by about 14.9% (= 0.0931*0.24/0.15). Again, risk-taking decrease by about 15% (= -
0.0411*2.5/0.15) for every one-standard deviation point increase in political connections. 
This tells us that the POL and CONN increase with the introduction of governance 
indicators. The governance variable introduced in this model is significant at 1% level 
and negatively related to corporate risk-taking. The evidence suggests that firms located 
in countries with relatively low governance outcomes compared to those with relatively 
high governance outcomes are relatively less likely to engage in risk-taking. Thus, for a 
one standard deviation increase in governance performance, there is a reduction of about 
7.9% (= -0.0119*1/0.15) standard deviation in risk-taking.  
For primary motivation for this paper, I run a separate regression for the advanced 
and emerging markets. These are shown in columns (3) – (6).  Columns (3) and (4) 
replicate results of columns (1) and (2) to study the effect mainly in advanced markets. 
The results are very similar to the pooled regression models in the first two columns. The 
results confirm the overly generalized conclusions in the extant literature. Thus, when 
combined, the effects expressed in the regression models are driven by the advanced 
economies. The findings show that in advanced economies, corporate risk-taking is 
significant and positively related to political institutions but negatively related to political 
connections, which is inconsistent with (Caprio et al., 2013) findings.  
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These findings imply that without controlling for governance performance, a one 
standard deviation point increase in political constraints and connections lead to an 
increase on average of about 29.9% (= 0.3202*0.14/0.15) and a decrease of about 25.9% 
(= -0.0168*2.31/0.51) for every one-standard deviation point increase in advanced 
markets respectively. I find statistical and economic significance for the interaction term. 
This indicates that increasing POL by one standard deviation point leads to an increase in 
risk-taking by 29.9% of a standard deviation with low political connections (DumCONN 
= 0). Also, average risk-taking is lower (DumCONN = 25.9%) and increasing POL by 
one standard deviation point decreases risk-taking by 19.4% (= (-0.1124+0.3202) * 
0.14/0.15) when there is a political connection (DumCONN = 1).  
These findings are consistent and statistically and economically significant when 
controlling for governance performance. This is illustrated in column (4). Risk-taking 
increases by about 29.4% (= 0.3146*0.14/0.15) for a standard deviation point increase in 
POL. In a similar fashion, risk-taking declines by approximately 27.4% (= -
0.0178*2.31/0.15) per one standard deviation point increase in CONN. The interaction 
between POL and DumCONN in column (4) is significant at the 1% level and negatively 
related to the level of risk-taking. The results are economically significant. The 
coefficient of this interaction term means that when there are low political connections 
(DumCONN = 0): increasing POL by one standard deviation point lead to an increase in 
risk-taking by 29.4% standard deviations. Also, when there is a political connection 
(DumCONN = 1): average risk-taking is lower (DumCONN = 27.4%) and increasing 
POL by one standard deviation point decreases risk-taking by 19.2% (= (-0.1092+0.3146) 
* 0.14/0.15). The results indicate that in the model for the advanced markets, ROA, 
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RINF, SIZE, and lnGROWTH are not significant, but LEV is significant and positive in 
explaining the level of corporate risk-taking. The results suggest that in advanced 
countries, strong or sound political institutions lead to higher corporate risk-taking. On 
the other hand, I find that high political connections lead to lower corporate risk-taking in 
these advanced economies.  
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Table 3: Regression Results 
Panel A: Evidence for Risk-taking 
Dependent Variable = Risk-Taking 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Pooled Reg Pooled Reg 
with Govern 
Advanced 
Markets 
Advanced 
Markets 
with Govern 
Emerging 
Markets 
Emerging 
Markets with 
Govern 
       
POL 0.0925*** 0.0931*** 0.3202*** 0.3146*** -0.1770*** -0.1712*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0064) (0.0064) 
CONN -0.0404*** -0.0411*** -0.0168*** -0.0178*** 0.0416*** 0.0426*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0072) (0.0071) 
ROA -0.0000* -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
FSD 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 0.0094*** 0.0093*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
RINF 0.0389*** 0.0383*** -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0013* -0.0002 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
CPINT -0.0260*** -0.0261*** -0.0186*** -0.0187*** -0.0244*** -0.0243*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
GDPPG -0.0106*** -0.0105*** -0.0133*** -0.0132*** -0.0070*** -0.0074*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
SIZE 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0040*** 0.0039*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
lnGROWTH -0.0023*** -0.0023*** 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0014*** -0.0012*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
LEV 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
GOVERN  -0.0102***  -0.0082***  0.0391*** 
  (0.0013)  (0.0014)  (0.0025) 
DumConn*POL   -0.1124*** -0.1092*** 0.2811*** 0.2746*** 
   (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0079) (0.0079) 
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Constant -0.0172 -0.0119 -0.1340*** -0.1254*** 0.0969*** 0.1628*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0346) (0.0347) (0.0063) (0.0074) 
       
Observations 420,551 420,525 302,517 302,517 118,034 118,008 
R-squared 0.1810 0.1812 0.1866 0.1867 0.3082 0.3098 
Industry & 
Country FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
 
 
Panel B: Evidence for Firm Performance 
Dependent Variable = Firm Performance (ROA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Pooled Reg Pooled Reg 
with Govern 
Advanced 
Markets 
Advanced 
Markets with 
Govern 
Emerging 
Markets 
Emerging 
Markets with 
Govern 
       
POL -0.0167 -0.0166 -1.5606** -1.8123** 1.3117 1.2957 
 (0.4207) (0.4174) (0.7429) (0.8049) (1.3978) (1.3983) 
CONN 0.2065 0.2264 -0.0721 -0.1193 -0.2082* -0.2063* 
 (0.2311) (0.2483) (0.2127) (0.2505) (0.1111) (0.1096) 
RISK -1.8213*** -1.8145*** -0.1517 -0.1588 0.3782 0.3775 
 (0.6427) (0.6415) (0.6933) (0.6857) (0.5376) (0.5367) 
FSD -0.0023 -0.0027 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0597 -0.0599 
 (0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0386) (0.0389) 
RINF -0.3653** -0.3539** 0.6569 0.6441 -0.0244 -0.0208 
 (0.1840) (0.1755) (0.6343) (0.6222) (0.0640) (0.0716) 
CPINT -0.2833 -0.2819 -1.3448** -1.3487** 1.1787 1.1795 
 (0.5160) (0.5166) (0.6796) (0.6812) (0.7535) (0.7541) 
GDPPG -0.0023 -0.0061 0.0262* 0.0312* -0.0426 -0.0432 
 (0.0212) (0.0237) (0.0157) (0.0177) (0.0397) (0.0416) 
SIZE 1.4939*** 1.4947*** 0.9253** 0.9238** 1.0742 1.0747 
 (0.3026) (0.3031) (0.4525) (0.4540) (0.6734) (0.6736) 
lnGROWTH -0.9534*** -0.9540*** -0.7045*** -0.7030*** -0.7781 -0.7786 
 (0.2054) (0.2056) (0.2052) (0.2063) (0.5180) (0.5178) 
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LEV -0.1939 -0.1938 -0.5912** -0.5912** -0.0175*** -0.0175*** 
 (0.1861) (0.1861) (0.2955) (0.2955) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
GOVERN  0.2721  -0.3748  0.0491 
  (0.2887)  (0.4462)  (0.2226) 
DumCONN*
POL 
  0.7293 0.8748 -1.5588 -1.5438 
   (0.8338) (0.7770) (1.3121) (1.3143) 
Constant -2.8805*** -3.0393*** 0.1548 0.5492 -1.5264 -1.4293 
 (1.0302) (1.1685) (2.0775) (2.4838) (1.1904) (1.0410) 
       
Observations 420,551 420,525 302,517 302,517 118,034 118,008 
R-squared 0.1530 0.1530 0.4883 0.4883 0.0097 0.0097 
Industry & 
Country FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: These regression results show evidence of how political connections and institutions 
affect corporate risk-taking and firm performance. The results are based on robust 
standard errors corrected for the grouping at the firm level. The standard errors are 
presented in parenthesis below the coefficients.  My key risk model in Panel A is significant 
at the 1% level. On the other hand, my performance model in Panel B is significant when 
there is an interaction between political connection and institutions but insignificant at the 
individual levels.  
 
Columns (5) and (6) replicates results from columns (3) and (4) to reflect 
evidence in emerging markets. Interestingly, the results indicate that the soundness of 
political institutions (POL) is significant and negatively related to corporate risk-taking. 
Connections to politics (CONN), is also significant and positively affect risk-taking. In 
effect, I postulate that when not controlling for governance performance, risk-taking by 
firms in emerging markets present in the sample decreases by about 36.6% (= -
0.1770*0.31/0.15) standard deviation points for every one-standard-deviation point 
increase in POL. With respect to how political connections affect risk-taking in emerging 
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markets by firms in the sample, I look at the coefficient of CONN in column (5). When 
there is a one-standard-deviation point increase in CONN, risk-taking increases on 
average by about 74.6% (= 0.0416*2.69/0.15).  
The interaction between POL and DumCONN is significant at 1% level and 
positively related to risk-taking. Again, the findings for emerging markets on this 
interaction show that when there are low political connections (DumCONN = 0): 
increasing POL by one standard deviation point lead to a decrease in risk-taking by 
36.6% standard deviations. But when there is a political connection (DumCONN = 1): 
average risk-taking is more (DumCONN = 74.6%) and increasing POL by one standard 
deviation point increases risk-taking by 21.5% (= 0.2811+ -0.1770) * 0.31/0.15). Column 
(6) introduces the effect of governance performance as I did in the earlier models. I find 
similar evidence as in column (5). In effect, the finding indicates that risk-taking declines 
on average by about 35.4% (= -0.1712*0.31/0.15). However, risk-taking increases in 
emerging markets on average by about 76.4% (= 0.0426*2.69/0.015) when there is one 
standard deviation point increase in CONN. The interaction term reveals that with low 
political connections (DumCONN = 0): increasing POL by one standard deviation point 
leads to a decrease in risk-taking by 35.4% standard deviations. But when there is a 
political connection (DumCONN = 1): average risk-taking is more (DumCONN = 
76.4%) and increasing POL by one standard deviation point increases risk-taking by 
21.4% (= 0.2746+ -0.1712) * 0.31/0.15).  
The findings for the emerging markets are inconsistent with Boubakri et al. 
(2013) and Murphy et al. (1991), but consistent with Caprio et al. (2013). They show that 
the inability of credible commitment on the part of the government not to interfere with 
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private property rights leads, among other things, to a delayed investment and, therefore, 
to a lower risk-taking by corporations. Governance is negatively and positively related to 
risk-taking in advanced and emerging markets, respectively, indicating that as 
governance improves in emerging markets, corporate risk-taking increases but risk-taking 
in advanced markets decreases. In terms of magnitude, governance performance in 
advance and emerging markets decreases and increases risk-taking by about 5.5% and 
26%, respectively.  
The study reveals that whilst both political connections and political constraints 
matters in emerging markets on impacting the level of risk-taking, the magnitude, and 
directionality changes. The results indicate that the more the connectedness, the higher 
the risk-taking and the higher the political constraints, the lesser the risk-taking by firms 
in the sample. 
In effect, the findings suggest that countries (advanced economies) with strong 
political institutions, firms are likely to undertake risky ventures, whereas countries 
(emerging markets) where firms have unsounded political institutions, they take less risky 
ventures. On the other hand, countries (advanced economies) where political connections 
are less, firms are less likely to take risky ventures, whereas, those found in emerging 
economies where political connections are more, firms are more likely to pursue risky 
ventures. As such, strong institutions or sound political environment lead to higher risk-
taking in advanced markets than in emerging markets, whereas, strong political 
connections lead to higher risk-taking in emerging markets than in advanced markets.  
I also observe that firms located in economies with high political connections and 
strong or sound political institutions, corporate risk-taking is higher as against firms 
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located in low politically connected economies. The results also conclude that emerging 
markets are different from advanced markets with regards to political institutions and 
corporate decision making regarding risk-taking. Thus, these markets are different and 
the overly generalized conclusion about the political environment and connections may 
be very well overstated.   
4.3 Evidence for Firm Performance 
Results in the pool regression and controlling for governance indicators show that 
political institutions and connections captured as POL and CONN are not significant in 
explaining how firms perform. Nonetheless, it is evident that in advanced economies, 
soundness of the political environment matters. The findings show that returns on assets 
for firms in the sample decreases by approximately 0.31% (= -1.5606*0.14/69.9) 
standard deviation points for every one-standard deviation point increase in POL. The 
effect size of this increases when I control for governance performance. I observe that 
returns on assets, ROA, fall by about 0.36% (= -1.8123*0.14/69.9). Also, there is no 
significance in the interaction between political connections and the soundness of the 
political environment. The results show that as the political environment deteriorates, 
firms do not perform well as their return on assets falls. In emerging markets, it is evident 
that the political environment does not matter. 
As political connections do not matter in advanced markets, it does matter in the 
emerging markets. The evidence shows that in emerging markets, as political connections 
increases, firms do not perform well as their return on assets fall. The detrimental effect 
is computed to be about 0.20% (= -0.2082*0.31/31.56) standard deviation point when 
POL increases by one standard deviation point. Again, I show that when I control for 
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governance performance, the effect size 0.20% (= -0.2063*0.31/31.56). The findings 
show that as the risk level increases, firm performance falls in the pool model. The effect 
size is estimated to be about 44.4% standard deviation point decrease in firm 
performance. The results confirm the findings by (Ling, Zhou, Liang, Song, & Zeng, 
2016).  
SIZE is significant at 5% level in the pool and advanced market models. The 
average asset growth over five years, lnGROWTH, is also found to be negative and 
significant at 5% level. Remittance flow to GDP, RINF, is found to be significant at 5% 
level and also affect firm performance negatively. The only control variable that is 
significant in the emerging market model is leverage, LEV which affects firm 
performance negatively as it increases. This evidence presupposes that in a politically 
corrupted environment, firms do not perform well. This finding confirms the assertion 
made by Fisman (2001) that well-connected firms may or may not see better performance 
due to the resources they may require in such a rent-seeking activity. Also, the evidence 
supports my argument that emerging markets are significantly different from advanced 
markets. 
The evidence shows that while the soundness of the political environment matters 
in advanced markets, it does not matter in an emerging market in explaining how firms 
perform. Also, the findings show that political connections matter in emerging markets 
but does not have any significant impact in advanced markets. Hence, in advanced 
markets where the political environment is more stable, firms located in such markets 
pursue more risky ventures. These firms might see negative returns if their risky ventures 
do not pay-off, as against emerging markets where the political environment seems to be 
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unstable and hence, firms do not take more risky ventures.  
4.4 Robustness Test 
To justify the arguments keenly, I perform some sensitivity tests to buttress and 
access the robustness of the main findings highlighted in Table 3. Some tests were left 
unreported for the sake of brevity. For instance, using the country-adjusted volatility of 
earnings for each firm over the entire sampling period (1992 - 2016), requiring at least 
five observations in cross-sectional regressions, captured as RISK1 and the country-wide 
average of all RISK observations at the enterprise level, captured as RISK2, I find the 
same evidence as that presented in Panel A of Table 3 for the risk-taking model. 
Additional tests presented in Table 4 reinforces and supports the main findings that with 
regards to risk-taking and firm performance, emerging markets are different from 
advanced markets. 
Since OLS is misspecified when the linearity assumption is violated (Jha & Cox, 
2015), an approach to tackle such concerns is by the use of propensity score matching 
technique which has been expounded extensively by (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). In this 
regard, I assert that countries with good or better governance are more likely to provide a 
sound political environment which will, in turn, attract firms. I split the sample into two 
based on the median value (0.45) of GOVERN. Good governance countries are classified 
as the treated group whereas the bad governance countries are classified as the control 
groups. The propensity score for each category of the observation, which is the 
probability of belonging to a good governance area is computed using a logit model. 
The results are presented in Panels A of Table 4. I find that the results are still 
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significant and robust using the propensity score matching. The evidence presented in 
Panel A are significant and shows the difference that exists in advanced and emerging 
markets. Also, in Panel A, I observe vast differences in the means of the main variable, 
POL and CONN based on the median value of governance for the two markets. This 
difference is significant at 1% level. Except for GDPPG, other control variables included 
in this test are significant as well. As observed earlier on, on average, political 
connections are more in emerging markets than in the advanced markets. The same effect 
is seen in the soundness of the political environment. 
4.5 Evidence in EAGLEs and NEST and Others 
Since the focus is primarily on emerging markets, I decided to further split the 
emerging markets component into EAGLEs and NEST as proposed by BBVA, 2014. The 
idea is basically to evidently show that although the various countries in emerging 
markets are the same in terms of economic development, governance structure and so on, 
yet they might exhibit similar characteristics due to how they are classified. In Table 4 
Panel B, I document the evidence that exists when I take into a closer look at EAGLEs 
and the NEST. Essentially, column (1) is a modified version of column (2) of Table 3 
Panel A after controlling for the interaction between connectedness and political 
constraints. Likewise, column (2) is just a repetition if column (4) of Panel A of Table 3, 
in order to aid a clear comparison between these markets.   
The evidence presented is economically and statistically significant. As expected, 
the full sample model and that of the advanced markets has a positive effect on the POL 
variable but a negative effect in both the EAGLEs and the NEST. I posit that for a one 
standard deviation point increase in POL, risk-taking by firms in the sample increases by 
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almost 22.6% and 29.4% standard deviation points in the pooled regression and advanced 
markets respectively. Consequently, in both EAGLEs and NEST, risk-taking declines by 
about 106.4% and 8.5% standard deviation points for every one-standard deviation point 
increase in POL respectively. It is not surprising to see the effect size in EAGLEs to be so 
large if I have the likes of China, Russia, Brazil and so on. These countries make up the 
major drivers of most economic activities not in emerging economies alone but in the 
world at large.  
With regards to political connections, again, the results in the full sample model 
and advanced markets are consistent with my expectations. I argue that risk-taking falls 
approximately by about 39.7% and 24.7% standard deviation points for a one standard 
deviation point increase in CONN. The dynamics flip a bit for the EAGLEs and the 
NEST. Nonetheless, this difference is expected. Whilst in the EAGLEs I observe a 
positive effect of CONN on risk-taking, I record a negative coefficient for the NEST. As 
mentioned earlier, the country with the highest political connections happens to be Russia 
which falls in the EAGLEs. Therefore, I believe that Russia and other similar economies 
have a major pull on the directionality leaving the NEST economies with a negative sign. 
The findings reveal that on average, when there is a standard deviation point increase in 
CONN, firms operating in the EAGLEs economies increases their level of risk-taking by 
about 70.3% standard deviation point increase whereas firms located in the NEST 
economies reduce risk-taking by on average 26.0% standard deviation point when there is 
a one standard deviation point increase in CONN. Again, I find consistent results for 
controlling for the interaction term and the introduction of governance performance. 
Interpretation of these coefficients and their magnitudes and effects are like the previous 
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interpretations.  
4.7 Controlling for the 2007/ 2009 Financial Crisis 
I am of the opinion that the effect of the financial crisis could be widespread that 
can affect both households and firms in both advanced and emerging economies. Hurd 
and Rohwedder  (2010) argued that the crisis left many people unemployed and in the 
long run, expectations about stock prices and housing prices cynical. Based on the 
foregoing arguments, I decided to control for the financial crisis to show that even though 
the effects of the 2007/2009 financial crisis could be widespread, the dynamics wouldn’t 
impact or change the results. To do this, I partition the data into three categories: before 
the financial crisis (Pre-Crisis), within the financial crisis (In-Crisis), and after the 
financial crisis (Post-Crisis). I utilize equation (1) and run nine models capturing the full 
sample, advanced markets, and emerging markets for the three categories mentioned and 
the results are shown in Panel C and D of Table 4. Panel C presents evidence for the full 
sample estimates. For POL, I observe that before the financial crisis, firms included in the 
sample reduce their level of risk-taking by about 7.23% standard deviation points. 
Interestingly, within the financial crisis and after the financial crisis, firms do increase the 
level of risk-taking which is consistent with the a priori expectation. On average, risk-
taking increases by about 8.4% and 5.7% during and after the financial crisis. Before the 
financial crisis, political connections did not matter in my full sample. Nonetheless, 
within and after the financial crisis, the effect size, magnitude, and directionality of the 
CONN are what I expect. I interpret the coefficients as that before. 
To my main motivation, Panel D of Table 4 shows the results for the advanced 
and emerging markets. Columns (1) – (3) presents the evidence in advanced markets and 
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evidence for the emerging markets are presented in columns (4) – (6). The results for the 
advanced markets reinforce the results I obtain for the full sample model. Column (1), 
before the financial crisis, deviates from my expectation but within and after the financial 
crisis hold consistent with what I expect. In columns (3) – (6) the effect of POL on risk-
taking is statistically and economically significant as well as coincides with my 
expectation. Therefore, in the presence of the financial crisis, I see that firm behavior 
regarding the level of risk-taking differs for the advanced and emerging markets for an 
increase in political constraints. 
The same evidence is found for the level of political connections in both markets. 
In advanced markets, I observe that within the financial crisis, political connections did 
not matter. Similarly, before the financial crisis, political connections did not matter in 
emerging markets. All else is consistent, significant and confirms my postulations. Once 
again, the magnitude of the effects is interpreted in the same manner as I have done 
before. It is key to point out that the interaction term and the introduction of the 
governance performance alternate signs in the models presented. 
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Table 4: Robustness Test 
Panel A: Propensity Matching Score 
Advanced_Makt 
             
Coef.            Std. Err.                 z 
            
P>z [95%Conf. Interval] 
POL -4.087 0.017 -243.790 0.000 -4.119 -4.054 
CONN -2.342 0.061 -38.590 0.000 -2.461 -2.223 
ROA 0.090 0.003 28.390 0.000 0.084 0.096 
CPINT 1.054 0.059 17.900 0.000 0.939 1.169 
GDPPG 0.000 0.000 2.070 0.038 0.000 0.001 
SIZE 1.906 0.037 52.060 0.000 1.835 1.978 
lnGROWTH 0.347 0.003 102.280 0.000 0.341 0.354 
LEV -0.025 0.005 -4.690 0.000 -0.036 -0.015 
_CONS -0.187 0.006 -33.320 0.000 -0.198 -0.176 
       
Variable Sample Advanced_Mkt Emerging_Mkt 
 
Difference            S.E.   T-stat 
GOVERN Unmatched -1.342 0.600 -1.943 0.002 
-
1195.130 
 
ATT -1.342 -0.068 -1.275 0.254 -5.010 
       
  
Mean T-Test 
 
 
Variable Advanced_Mkt Emerging_Mkt            t 
                     
p>t 
 
 
POL -1.343 -0.068 -450.370 0.000 
 
 
CONN 0.658 0.747 -148.660 0.000 
 
 
ROA 3.328 3.870 -43.000 0.000 
 
 
CPINT 0.207 0.306 -159.460 0.000 
 
 
GDPPG -0.109 -0.072 -0.340 0.731 
 
 
SIZE 0.349 0.695 -297.340 0.000 
 
 
lnGROWTH 4.036 14.651 -302.210 0.000 
 
 
lev 7.142 5.274 171.810 0.000 
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Panel B: Splitting Emerging Markets into EAGLEs and NEST and Others 
Dependent Variable = Risk-Taking 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Pooled Reg with 
Interaction 
Advanced 
Markets 
EAGLEs NEST & Others 
POL 0.1412*** 0.3146*** -0.4838*** -0.0611*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0114) (0.0101) (0.0080) 
CONN -0.0238*** -0.0178*** 0.0447*** -0.1250*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0070) (0.0010) 
DumCONN*POL -0.0750*** -0.1092*** 0.6712*** 0.0935*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0076) (0.0122) (0.0097) 
ROA -0.0000** -0.0000 0.0000*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
FSD 0.0031*** 0.0028*** 0.0081*** 0.0123*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
RINF 0.0392*** -0.0008 0.0112*** 0.0040*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0032) (0.0015) (0.0012) 
CPINT -0.0258*** -0.0187*** -0.0214*** -0.0341*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0028) 
GDPPG -0.0104*** -0.0132*** -0.0139*** 0.0007*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
SIZE 0.0028*** 0.0002 -0.0008** 0.0101*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
lnGROWTH -0.0024*** 0.0002 0.0054*** -0.0071*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
LEV 0.0000 0.0000*** -0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
GOVERN -0.0075*** -0.0082*** 0.0561*** 0.0026 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0036) (0.0030) 
Constant -0.0423 -0.1254*** 0.2396*** -0.0255*** 
 (0.0335) (0.0347) (0.0120) (0.0095) 
     
Observations 420,525 302,517 71,292 46,716 
R-squared 0.1822 0.1867 0.3336 0.3539 
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Industry & Country 
FE 
YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Note: In Table 4, I present my robustness test using Propensity Matching Score and 
splitting the markets (emerging) into EAGLEs and NEST. Panel A shows the result using 
a Propensity Matching Score approach. My main variable is significant as well as 
consistent with my a priori expectation. In Panel B, I split my emerging markets into 
EAGLEs and NEST and still find consistent results.  
 
Panel C: Controlling for Financial Crisis – Full Sample 
Dependent Variable = Risk - Taking 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Pre-Crisis In-Crisis Post-Crisis 
POL -0.0455*** 0.0522*** 0.0357*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0090) (0.0086) 
CONN 0.0023 -0.0079*** -0.0122*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0021) 
DumCONN*POL -0.0382*** 0.0062* -0.0094 
 (0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0059) 
ROA -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000* 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
FSD 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0011*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
RINF 0.0235*** 0.0087*** -0.0100*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0025) 
CPINT 0.0013 0.0023*** -0.0038*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0014) 
GDPPG -0.0211*** -0.0079*** -0.0238*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
SIZE -0.0021*** -0.0002** 0.0009*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
lnGROWTH 0.0009*** 0.0002*** -0.0005** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
LEV -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
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 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
GOVERN 0.0182*** -0.0479*** -0.0645*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0021) 
Constant 0.2349*** 0.0582*** 0.3139*** 
 (0.0344) (0.0105) (0.0614) 
    
Observations 204,188 64,281 152,056 
R-squared 0.1407 0.5385 0.1122 
Industry & Country FE YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: In panel C of Table 4, I show robustness test results by controlling for the 2007/2009 
financial crisis. Columns (1) – (3) are the results for the full sample model. Again, I find 
consistent results for the full model as presented in Panel C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
Panel D: Controlling for Financial Crisis – Advanced vs Emerging Markets 
Dependent Variable = Risk - Taking 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Advanced 
Markets with 
Pre-Crisis 
Advanced 
Markets with 
In-Crisis 
Advanced 
Markets with 
Post-Crisis 
Emerging 
Markets with 
Pre-Crisis 
Emerging 
Markets with 
In-Crisis 
Emerging 
Markets with 
Post-Crisis 
POL -0.0258*** 0.0497*** 0.3095*** -0.0492*** -1.1039*** -0.0747*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0065) (0.0132) (0.0091) (0.0440) (0.0116) 
CONN -0.0148*** 0.0015 -0.0273*** 0.0106 0.0659*** -0.0206*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0125) (0.0026) (0.0078) 
DumCONN*POL 0.0433*** -0.0048 0.0206*** -0.0444*** 1.4643*** -0.2323*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0050) (0.0064) (0.0110) (0.0438) (0.0220) 
ROA -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0012*** -0.0000*** 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
FSD 0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0014*** 0.0056*** 0.0016*** 0.0040*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
RINF -0.0215*** -0.0377*** -0.0141** 0.0241*** 0.0296*** -0.0386*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0039) (0.0061) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0029) 
CPINT 0.0056*** 0.0029*** -0.0029 0.0058** 0.0000 -0.0063*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0009) (0.0022) 
GDPPG -0.0407*** -0.0093*** -0.0192*** -0.0101*** -0.0032*** -0.0291*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
SIZE -0.0039*** -0.0002*** 0.0011*** 0.0009*** 0.0005*** 0.0013*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
lnGROWTH 0.0032*** 0.0003*** -0.0007** -0.0016*** -0.0006*** -0.0004 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
LEV -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000*** -0.0001 0.0001*** -0.0000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
GOVERN 0.0153*** -0.0425*** -0.0748*** 0.0882*** -0.0561*** -0.0651*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0036) (0.0041) (0.0035) 
Constant 0.3538*** 0.0491*** 0.0787 0.1714*** 0.4341*** 0.2226*** 
 (0.0407) (0.0083) (0.0599) (0.0094) (0.0159) (0.0104) 
Observations 155,723 44,530 102,264 48,465 19,751 49,792 
R-squared 0.2482 0.5676 0.0720 0.1751 0.5942 0.2455 
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Industry & 
Country FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Panel D of Table 4 show results after controlling for the financial crisis in the two 
markets. Columns (1) – (3) highlight results in the advanced markets for the before, in, and 
post financial crisis. Results for emerging markets are represented in columns (4) – (6). 
Again, I find consistent results supporting my claim that emerging markets differ from 
advanced markets. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATION  
In this paper, I investigate the impact of political connections on firm 
performance and corporate risk-taking and make a case that emerging markets are 
different from advanced markets. The research questions were: Do a firm's political 
connections affect their performance? How do political connections affect corporate risk-
taking? Are emerging markets different from advanced markets? The results are 
economically and statistically significant as well as robust. The results suggest strong 
political institutions or a sound political environment lead to higher risk-taking in 
advanced markets but lower risk-taking in emerging markets. Specifically, on average, 
risk-taking in advanced markets increases by about 30% standard deviation points for 
every standard deviation point increase in political constraints, whereas in emerging 
markets, risk-taking decreases by about 37% standard deviations for every standard 
deviation point increase in political constraints. On the other hand, strong political 
connections lead to higher risk-taking in emerging markets but lower levels in advanced 
markets. In terms of magnitude, for an every one-standard-deviation point increase in 
political connections, risk-taking in advanced and emerging markets decrease (increase) 
by about 26% (75%) standard deviation points, respectively.  
The results also indicate that political institutions have an insignificant effect in 
emerging markets but have adverse effects in advanced markets when it comes to firm 
performance. Similarly, political connections are found to be insignificant in advanced 
markets but have an adverse effect in emerging markets. These findings illustrate that 
these two markets are distinctively different; hence, studies that combine them into a 
single group will ignore such realities and lead to overgeneralized findings. These 
findings are consistent after controlling for the 2007/2009 financial crisis, running a 
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Propensity Matching Score, splitting the emerging markets into EAGLEs and NEST, as 
well as running an endogeneity test. The results suggest that governments in both 
advanced and emerging markets needs to take necessary steps to control corruption to set 
a fertile investment grounds and thus decrease political connections and extractions. 
This research contributes to the extant literature by analyzing the impact of 
political connections on firm performance and corporate risk-taking, and by separating 
emerging economies from advanced economies, and by controlling for the effect of 
governance. This approach is different from the extant literature that sort to combine all 
markets in a single study (Boubakri et al., 2013; Faccio, 2006). Another contribution of 
this study is to analyze of interacting high political connected areas with the soundness of 
the political environment. To the best of my knowledge, I have a more sample pool and 
broader year range than most of most of the literatures reviewed. I have 47 sample size 
which spans from 1996 – 2016 with a total observation of 562, 867, unlike (Boubakri et 
al., 2013; Faccio, 2006) that had only 211,794 and 20,202 observation respectively. 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Definitions Data Source 
Dependent Variable  
RISK  Estimated as country-specific ROA in five-year 
overlapping periods beginning in 1992 and ending 
in 2016. 
COMPUSTAT 
RISK1 Computed as the country-adjusted standard deviation of 
the firm’s profitability (ROA) over 5-year overlapping 
periods starting in 1992 and ending in 2016. 
COMPUSTAT 
ROA Measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization to total assets. 
COMPUSTAT 
RISK2 Computed as the country-wide average of all RISK 
observations at the enterprise level. 
COMPUSTAT 
Testing Variable   
POL Measures the degree of political constraint of a country. 
Derived from a model of political interaction that 
incorporates information on the number of independent 
branches of government with veto power, and the 
distribution of preferences across and within those 
branches. Government branches considered are chief 
executives, the lower house of the legislature, the higher 
house of the legislature, judiciary, and sub-federal 
branches. Higher scores indicate stronger political 
constraints and sound political institutions. 
Henisz (2010) 
CONN % of firms connected with a minister or MP is the 
number of firms connected with a minister or MP, 
excluding cases of close relationships, divided by the 
total number of firms listed in a country. 
Faccio (2006) 
LEV The ratio of total debt to total assets. COMPUSTAT 
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GROWTH Average assets growth over five years, where assets are 
converted into US$. 
COMPUSTAT 
CPINT It is a measure of the amount of capital needed per dollar 
of revenue. It is calculated by dividing the total assets of 
a company by its sales. 
COMPUSTAT 
SIZE Log of total assets in millions of US$ COMPUSTAT 
FSD Financial system deposits to GDP (%) Financial 
Structure 
Databases 
GDPPG GDP per capita growth (annual %) World 
Governance 
Indicators 
GOVERN A proxy for the governance indicators computed from 
Principal Component Analysis. 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
RINF Remittance inflows to GDP (%) Financial 
Structure 
Databases 
VA VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: ESTIMATE Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
RQ Regulatory quality: estimate Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
PSA Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism: 
estimate 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
CC Control of corruption: estimate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
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GE Government effectiveness: estimate Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
RL Rule of law: estimate Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
           
